

# National security strategy as a background to disaster planning: A Finnish Case Study

Harriet Lonka

University of Eastern Finland, P.O.Box 111, 80101 Joensuu, Finland  
E-mail: harriet.lonka@gmail.com

The effectiveness of strategic planning in a security context as a background for disaster planning depends on the means and mechanisms available for taking the strategic issues into account in actual crisis decision making. Identifying such mechanisms is critical to effective disaster planning and management.

This paper examines findings from an assessment of Finnish governmental approaches to national security strategy embodied in “The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to society” (YETT) across 2003 and 2006 including recent interviews with 12 Chiefs of Ministerial portfolios, as they relate to efficiency and effectiveness of decision making before and during disaster responses.

The paper discusses findings in three areas:

1) The need for clarity of the system of leadership and the division of responsibilities between and inside the government sectors.

2) Safeguarding the basic human rights of participation in decision-making for resource allocation, ensuring the involvement of different stakeholders (e.g. business organizations, NGOs) in disaster management activities.

3) Ensuring whole-government situational awareness is sustained with enhanced exchange of information between the sectors, enabling lessons learned knowledge application in the crisis decision making.

The paper concludes with a series of opportunities for Finland (and elsewhere) in aligning national strategy with disaster response planning.

**Key Words:** *government, security strategy, security, strategy, public value, rationality, emergence*

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The basis for national security strategy work in Finland as in many other Western countries lies in the identified need to respond to fast and continuous changes in the security environment. The growing interdependency, globalization and vulnerable infrastructures are examples of challenges which set demand for comprehensive security strategy work at a national level. The external threats set the pressure for the work but response to the challenges urges for efficient internal actions. An important mechanism in the national security strategy work is the cross sectional co-operation aiming at increasing the societal resilience in face of new and unexpected threats.

This paper examines findings from an assessment of Finnish governmental approaches to national security strategy embodied in “The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to society” (SFVS) across 2003 and 2006. The purpose of the study is to outline the security strategy work and to describe how it tackles the changes in the Finland’s threat landscape. The focus of the study is on understanding how strategy work creates groundings for national preparedness work and disaster planning. The study material reflects the experiences of the chiefs of ministries on creating and implementing the strategy as well as on their expectations for further development of the strategy process. The study findings are elaborated and analyzed in three partly overlapping dimensions which are: rationality, public value and emergence.

In this study the government is defined as a leader for the national administration and the security strategy is seen as a tool to support this leadership. The focus is on identifying the mechanisms which enable the strategic

security leadership. These mechanisms are central in ensuring and supporting the effective disaster planning and management at the national level.

The national security strategy work in Finland is built on the traditional defense and security political background. Thus the changes which have affected these policies have had an effect on the security strategy approaches as well. The underlying parameters for these changes have been connected to regional and geopolitical as well as global phenomena. There were considerable changes in the threat landscape forming the basis for security strategy work soon after the end of the cold war. Instead of the war threat the focus turned to the so called new threats. The first definitions of the new threats included technological and natural catastrophes as well as large pandemics. After the WTC attacks terrorism and organized crime started to get more attention in threat scenarios.

In general the threats started to separate themselves from geopolitics and regional bindings. The dominating factors on security were transforming from place bound to dependences of complex technology systems and fast changes in the environment: *It is not space, but pace that is the important defining element.*<sup>1)</sup>

The OECD report *Emerging Systemic Risks*<sup>2)</sup> identified several developments which form background for the global new threats. These are demographic changes, environmental risks like climate change, scarcity of water and degradation of biodiversity, technological risks and vulnerability of societies, whose root cause is in socioeconomic changes. The OECD report describes the demands set for the risk management strategies as follows: *Successful risk management strategies in future will therefore need to adapt their instruments to this new context: provide information and promote risk awareness; create sound and effective incentives; develop partnerships; clarify the legal frameworks and make adequate use of legal tools; co-ordinate national policies; and, when necessary, create international tools.*<sup>3)</sup>

The Finnish security strategy work has started in 2003 by publishing the first Government Resolution on Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society. The background for this government resolution was set in the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy in 2001. The strategy has been reviewed in 2006 and 2010. The latest security strategy has been renamed to Security Strategy for Society.

The principles, objectives and implementation criteria for Finland's security and defense policy have been provided in the government Security and Defence Reports 2001, 2004 and 2009. The security strategy resolutions have been concretizing these principles and goals. The strategies provide the common basis for preparedness activities for all actors in society.

## **2. PUBLIC SECTOR STRATEGY WORK AND DISASTER PLANNING**

Mintzberg et al.<sup>4)</sup> differ between intended, realized and emergent strategies. The important question raised by them is: must realized strategies always have been intended? Intentions that are fully realized can be called deliberate strategies. The emergent strategy is the one in which a pattern realized was not expressly intended. Actions were taken, one by one, which converged over time to some sort of consistency of pattern.

This definition carries some similarity to what Lindblom describes in his classic papers in terms of incrementalism<sup>5)</sup>. According to Mintzberg et al. all real world strategies need to mix the approaches in order to exercise control while fostering learning. Thus, emergent strategies are not necessarily bad and deliberate strategies good; effective strategists mix these in ways that reflect the conditions at hand, notably the ability to predict as well as the need to react to unexpected events.

Bryson<sup>6)</sup> describes strategic planning in public sector as a set of concepts, procedures and tools designed to help leaders, managers and planners think, act, and learn strategically. He claims that used in wise and skillful ways by coalition of interested parties, strategic planning can help organizations focus on producing effective decisions and actions that create public value, further the organization's mission, meet organizational mandates, and satisfy key stakeholders.

At the same time, in public organizations the challenge may arise from acting in a shared-power environment: how to organize action and learning collaboratively within an inter organizational network or among networks where no one person, group, organization, or institution is fully in charge but where many are involved, or affected, or have a partial responsibility to act.

The public leadership and thus its strategic groundings are tested in times of crisis. Crises are no more neatly delineated in time and space but extended periods of high threat, high uncertainty and high politics that disrupt ordinary political and organizational processes<sup>7)</sup>. There are constraints which inhibit efficient governmental action under pressure. One such is bureaucratic habit, which inhibits the processes of collaborative information search, exchange and feedback essential for constructive, coordinated actions<sup>8)</sup>.

To learn from a crisis event is not an easy task for the political leaders due to flaws of the institutional memory at the government level. Yet, to invest on crisis prevention activities is not easy for the politicians either as Boin and 't Hart describe: *If they implement crisis prevention, they are chastised for doing too much too soon. If they ignore crisis prevention, they are scolded for having done too little, too late.*

### 3. THE METHOD AND RESEARCH SETTING

As a basic approach of this study the task of the Government is defined as broad strategic steering of the administration, while the ministries are responsible to set the targets of its subordinate administration<sup>9)</sup>.

The material for the study was collected in connection to the assessment of Finnish governmental approaches to national security strategy embodied in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society across 2003 and 2006. The main empirical material compiles of interviews of 12 chiefs of ministries carried out in spring 2009.

The interviews were half structured. They were based on a questionnaire but the interviewees were given the freedom to reflect more deeply those themes which were the most relevant for them. Each interview formed a written document of 2-3 pages.

The freedom of varying the themes according to the interviewee's interest was found to be important as the issues in connection to the security strategy work are sensitive. Thus the interviewee, who holds a high position in the administration, must define what issues he or she will bring up.

The material is analyzed in a framework of three research aspects which are: rationality, public value and emergence and complexity. These aspects were chosen for analytic approach as they were expected to help reveal different and complementing points of view of strategy process and strategy related decision making.

Rationality is a classic phenomenon thoroughly discussed by Weber<sup>10)</sup>. As Simon<sup>11)</sup> describes, rationality can be defined in many ways depending on the angle of the study. I have applied division of Bartels<sup>12)</sup> on formal and substantive rationality. Formal rationality puts weight on formal models and hierarchies while substantive rationality underlines the use of one's own knowledge and on the ethical responsibility of decision maker in use of information and knowledge as part of the decision making process.

Aspect of rationality is reflected in those interview results which describe the implementation of strategy and the elements of management system and leadership. These include reasoning of mutual competences of different government sections and needs identified for changes in the management system and leadership and its supporting structures.


Creating public value can be seen as a central function of public administration<sup>13)</sup>. Edwards<sup>14)</sup> has provided a useful resume on comparison between traditional public administration, NPM thinking and public value approach. That approach has been central in my analysis on public value aspects of the material.

The aspects of public value are reflected in results expressing the developments of cross-sectional approaches and defining values in connection to interfaces of different sectors. The focus is on the entity of the preparedness system and how the general principles of securing vital functions are taken into account.

Complexity and emergence are keenly interrelated features. I have applied Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) theory approach described by Alaa<sup>15)</sup> and Lichtenstein<sup>16)</sup> in my analysis. Meek and Nowell<sup>17)</sup> have given to my work an important input in describing of the Interdisciplinary Theory. Their work raises an issue on how public management can tackle the complex problems and at the same time respect the different values and inputs of variety of stakeholders.

Emergence and complexity are reflected in interview results tackling the available mechanisms for creating a common understanding of changes of threat landscape and taking into account these changes in decision making. In this connection the challenges created by reorganization of the administration and the keeping up the situation awareness as well as aspects of collecting information and learning lessons from past events are brought up.

The different aspects of the analyzing framework are partly overlapping as illustrated in Figure 1.



**Fig.1** Interrelations of different research aspects of analysis of the security strategy work.

#### **4. SECURITY STRATEGY IN SUPPORTING THE STATE LEADERSHIP**

The Finnish Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (from 2010 on: Security Strategy for Society) defines society’s vital functions and establishes targets and development policies that will guide each administrative branch of the government in dealing with its strategic tasks in all situations<sup>10)</sup>. In the review or resolution in 2010 the comprehensive and intersectional approach is further underlined<sup>11)</sup>. In the Resolution, strategic tasks refer to tasks which are needed to secure the functions vital to society in all situations. They are based on current legislation and the existing divisions on powers between different authorities.

The functions vital to society were defined in Resolution 2003 as follows: state leadership, external capacity to act, the nation’s military defense, internal security, functioning of the economy and society, securing the livelihood of the population and its capacity to act, and their ability to tolerate a crisis. The principles to be observed in securing society’s vital functions were in Resolution 2003 defined as: maintaining democracy, and the principle of the rule of law; effective and appropriate use of society’s resources; standardization of the command structure; organizations and areas of responsibility; flexible adjustment of preparedness; ensuring cost-effectiveness; securing necessary resources; making best use of the international dimension; and monitoring and developing preparedness and performance.

In this work the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (SSFVS) is defined as a tool for supporting the state leadership. It supports the government in management and coordination of the activities in different governmental sections in connection to preparedness to secure vital functions in all times. Strategy also conveys to the public sector actors the values on safeguarding the vital functions as defined by the government in accordance with its representation of political weightings. At the same time strategy process connects the expert knowledge of government officers to these value definitions.

The strategy process is studied from three research aspects which are: rationality, public value and emergence. The central findings connected to these aspects are resumed in the Table 1.

##### **(1) Rationality: Competences and management system**

The central target of the SFVS Strategy has been to enhance the cross sectional co-operation in public sector preparedness work. In this sense strategy has served as a new and unique tool similar to which had not existed before.

An important challenge has all the time remained to define the competencies among governmental and other public sector bodies in situations, which are somewhere between exceptional conditions and ordinary disruptive situations. This includes a demand to further refine the leadership system in ordinary situations in such a way that command and control system remains clear and functional.

*‘We would need to have a possibility for increasing the powers of different authorities in smaller steps than actual definitions of Emergency Powers Act outlines.’*

The key issue for the management system seems to be that the command and control system as well as legislation on competencies and division of responsibilities are kept as simple and transparent as possible.

*'We must take care of that the competent authority always remains in charge. In crisis where we already have enough difficulties no exceptional arrangements will work.'*

An interesting aspect is the positioning of the Government Resolution on SFVS Strategy in relation to the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy. The Government Report is presented in the Parliament and Parliament takes official position to it. The Government Resolution, however, is only presented to Parliament to its knowledge. This difference has raised a question of the mandate of the SFVS Strategy in supervision of the administration. The Parliament's participation in the Strategy discussion is also interesting when we assess the connection of the security strategy work to the democratic processes in the society in general.

The actual effectiveness of the SVFS Strategy in guiding the governmental sections depends strongly on the weight which government bodies set to the implementation of the strategy. The Chiefs of ministries hold a central role in this respect. The commitment of the administration was not self-evident at the launching of the first SVFS strategy in 2003.

An important aspect considering the efficiency of the SVFS Strategy was from the beginning the question of financing the actions which were responsibility of the government section in question. In the first SVFS Strategy 2003 an idea of common responsibility of the government sections in financing the cross-sectional actions was presented. At the same time the sectional development programs on safeguarding the functions vital to society were given as responsibility of government sections. This appeared to be not a well-functioning idea. After the first evaluation of the SVFS Strategy the financing of actions was agreed to be connected to ordinary procedure of financial planning in each section. This change was realized before 2009 interviews:

*'Our aims on SVFS issues are integrated in the general policy targets of our section, and thus no separate mechanisms for deciding the finances are needed.'*

The division of responsibilities in the framework of the SVFS Strategy is keenly connected to the question of who is actually contributing in the substance contents of the strategy. From the point of view of government sections them having the initiative in raising the strategy issues was seen of great importance. From the point of view of the officers responsible for coordinating the strategy work this was experienced to turn the Strategy outcome more fragmented and incoherent. The positive effect of sections' having the initiative was, however, that it considerably increased their commitment to the strategy process.

## **(2) Public value: Organizational learning and involving stakeholders**

In this study the organizational learning and stakeholder involvement are seen as mechanisms to introduce public value considerations in the strategy process. The common lessons learned activities are key issue in enabling and enhancing cross-sectional co-operation to improve preparedness. The increase of stakeholders' involvement urges for understanding of the expectations of the surrounding society on the strategy work and also self-reflectance on how the strategy conveys public values.

Launching the strategy process in the framework of SVFS Strategy was seen to have considerably increased the lessons learned activities - both in connection to real situations and exercises - in different sections. This influenced directly to sections' ideas on substance issues needed to be included in the strategy formulations.

In Finland the official body to investigate major accidents is the Safety Investigation Authority. During the first years of SVFS Strategy process the SIA had not had many other cases to study than typical accidents (fires, traffic accidents). An important turning point for both SIA and the Government Office was the Asian Catastrophe in December 2004 which caused loss of lives of 178 Finnish individuals in Thailand. Need to organize evacuation for the Finns due to a major catastrophe abroad was an action which had not been included in any of the national level threat scenarios till that time.

It was also the first time that SIA came close in its analysis to the actions and deeds of the Government as part of its investigation. The flaw of that investigation was, from the point of view of the Government Office, that it didn't give structured feedback on the GO management system for crisis situations. According to the Law on Major Accident Investigation (Since 2011: Law on Safety Investigation) such an aspect was not to be included in the investigation report. Operationalization of the lessons learned from the Asian Catastrophe

concerning State crisis management system remained a duty of Government Office and it did make a difference while rewriting the SVFS Strategy for update in 2006.

Involvement of the NGOs in the strategy process has not been a clear issue. In interview results it became obvious that the interviewees were not recognizing the participation of NGOs in the strategy process as a value in itself. Rather the answers reflected the idea of functionality: to involve the NGOs is useful from the point of view of the general acceptance of the strategy. The chiefs of ministries pointed out that the responsibility of the preparedness lies with the public authorities and that responsibility cannot in any part be transferred to voluntary organizations.

In cases of security related issues the free information flow is in many ways restricted. That is also an aspect which was seen to hinder the openness of the security strategy process to general public. On the other hand some interviewees brought up also the challenge of keeping the strategy process open inside the administration. There was a concern articulated on how to ensure the use of expert knowledge across the section borders and also vertically inside the government bodies.

In the interview material the need to increase involvement of business world in the strategy process was actively brought up. The need for more integration with business stakeholders was recognized in many real life cases. One acute issue in Finland was the out-flagging of ships and the effect this had made to the emergency supply management. The common EU competition legislation had also in several cases been experienced to have affected the freedom to make choices in accordance with the emergency supply needs. In addition to more integration of business community in strategy process also a more substantial need to include international perspective to the national security strategy work was pointed out. This expectation was not only about reacting to changes in the globalizing environment but also urged for taking more keenly into account the complex partnerships and interdependencies in foreign trade in the strategy reasoning.

### **(3) Public value: The basic principles to be observed in securing society's vital functions**

The aspect of public value in connection to SVFS Strategy is clearly articulated in listing the basic principles to be observed in securing society's vital functions. They are: maintaining democracy, and the principle of the rule of law; effective and appropriate use of society's resources; standardization of the command structure; organizations and areas of responsibility; flexible adjustment of preparedness; ensuring cost-effectiveness; securing necessary resources; making best use of the international dimension; and monitoring and developing preparedness and performance.

The interviewees commented on these principles, although many felt that these are self-evidently the basic values to be appreciated in administration in all times. The question of democracy raised the issue of interconnections between political leadership and leadership of public authorities in times of crisis. The strong expert leadership was demanded, yet the political leadership was recognized to have become more dominant in recent crisis. This is much due to increasing media interest during crisis.

*'The Government Ministers have become more holders of this personal responsibility during times of crises.'*

The question of flexible adjustment of the preparedness was seen to be keenly connected to the issue of basic rights. The chiefs of ministries had many experiences where they had witnessed a switch of use of resources for preparedness according to the demand of some individual interest raised by sudden media exposure. Such pressure was easily directing the attention to change certain details in the preparedness system and at the same time it might hinder the system from taking comprehensively into account e.g. the actions needed to safeguard the basic rights in crisis.

A concrete example of interconnection between flexible adjustment and basic rights was experienced in reasoning on preparing for pandemics by vaccination. If resources are small the adjustment may cause inequality among citizens in certain cases.

The cost-effectiveness in securing vital functions was experienced in some cases to be in controversy with the common trend of outsourcing public duties.

*'First we give away and then we start preparing new systems inside the administration instead of the old ones.'*

#### **(4) Emergence: From planning tradition to responding to new threats**

A central issue in modern security strategy work is how the strategy can take into account changes in the environment and respond to emerging new threats. The cross sectional co-operation forms a good grounding for comprehensive whole-government situation awareness. The opposing forces are e.g. tendency to stick to the formal sector definitions and formalism in producing and applying the new information. The traditional planning ideology combined with the strong tradition of secrecy in connection to handling safety and security related information is a challenge in itself for a living strategy process.

Practical challenges reflected in answers of chiefs of ministries concerned first of all the abilities and willingness for cross-sectional information exchange. In addition to that the challenges on prioritization of different security issues in the strategy work and creating ownership in security strategy issues beyond the traditional Ministry for Defence domination were brought up.

The first rounds of SVFS Strategy work applied a procedure where the government ministries brought their own issues up in common discussion and these were not questioned by the others. This procedure directed the process to an outcome which included issues with large variation and little prioritization.

*‘We should be more active in updating our threat scenarios. Now too much different things are mixed: disruption of data infrastructure versus ordinary fire. The everyday life inconveniences are quite different from real needs for increasing national level preparedness.’*

Equal concern compared to the prioritization issue was expressed on improvement needs for real cross-sectional co-operation. Many interviewees were longing for real cross-sectional analysis to form basis for the common strategy. After such an analysis the government ministries would be able to divide the responsibility according to their existing and regulation based share of responsibilities.

The most important substantial aspects to be taken into account in updating the SVFS Strategy which came up in the interviews can be grouped in following three entities:

- 1) *Changes in the global environment:* the increasing interdependencies in global economy, the dependency on EU decision making and effects of that to the emergency supply matters, the growing internationalization of businesses and markets affecting the possibilities of public sector to support local food production.
- 2) *The mixing of private and public responsibilities:* increase of private ownership in critical sectors especially concerning critical infrastructures like energy, information and communication systems.
- 3) *Division of responsibilities between different levels of administration:* the ongoing regionalization of the state activities and reorganization of the service structures at the local level make management of the strategic entities more and more challenging.

The answers show that the pressure for updating the security strategy does not arise only from external changes. Also internal factors like demand for more cost-efficient administration and regionally decreasing resources for service production create new challenges for national preparedness work.

**Table 1** The experienced aspects of strategy process and the challenges for further improvement in 2009 material.

	<b>Experienced aspects of strategy process</b>	<b>Central challenges for further improvement of strategy process</b>
<b>Rationality related</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continuous development of preparedness system and follow up.</li> <li>• Improvement of strategy as part of target oriented financial planning.</li> <li>• Clarity of the management system.</li> <li>• Clarity of mutual competences.</li> <li>• Commitment of the management to strategy process and underlining its importance in the organization.</li> <li>• Strategy work as part of everyday activities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Understanding preparedness only as a reactive activity</li> <li>→ Getting strategy needs integrated in the general policy targets of each section</li> <li>→ Keeping the management system and legislations simple and transparent.</li> <li>→ Enhancing the clarity of division of responsibilities and cross-sectional co-operation</li> <li>→ Appreciating different roles of different government sections</li> <li>→ Protectionist attitudes of different sections against each other</li> </ul>
<b>Public value related</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Whole-government thinking launched, vital functions defined together.</li> <li>• Democracy and political decision making has a role in decision making.</li> <li>• Parliament is participating via its role in guiding the ministries.</li> <li>• Cost efficiency.</li> <li>• Increased participation of the business community.</li> <li>• Increased participation and motivation of NGOs.</li> <li>• Flexible adjustment of preparedness according to the nature of crisis.</li> <li>• Division of responsibilities in accordance with management structures of normal situations.</li> <li>• Safeguarding of resources.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Keeping up and enhancing connection to practical preparedness work and self-induced development.</li> <li>→ Clarity of mutual competences and division of responsibilities between politicians and government officers.</li> <li>→ Further development of Gov. Security Report process and increasing Parliament's participation in strategy process.</li> <li>→ Management of outsourced activities in preparedness work.</li> <li>→ Enhancing the ownership of business community in the strategy process.</li> <li>→ Appreciating the comprehensive responsibility of public authorities and sovereignty of the NGOs.</li> <li>→ Basic rights vs. limited resources.</li> <li>→ Keeping the division of responsibilities clear in all circumstances.</li> <li>→ Safeguarding resources if necessary also cross sectional.</li> </ul>
<b>Emergence and complexity related</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threat scenarios and importance to update them commonly accepted.</li> <li>• Continuous change demands active co-operation.</li> <li>• Common model for action, to which every party has committed itself, assists open exchange of information.</li> <li>• Target oriented development of situation awareness system.</li> <li>• Increasing amount of lessons learned from real situations available.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>→ Internal development needs, taking into account of reorganizations of administration.</li> <li>→ Continuous change threats to induce unclarity to the preparedness system.</li> <li>→ The internal logic of the strategy and its functionality such that it supports identification of new threats.</li> <li>→ The effects of new threats difficult to assess and working to prevent them not often possible.</li> <li>→ Analyzing real situations in a comprehensive manner.</li> </ul>

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

In this work the Finnish Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society (SSFVS) is defined as a tool for supporting the state leadership. It supports the government in management and coordination of the activities in different governmental sections in connection to preparedness to secure vital functions in all times. Strategy also conveys to the public sector actors the values on safeguarding the vital functions and connects the expert knowledge of government officers to these value definitions.

The rationality aspect reflects the organization of the strategy work, division of responsibilities and management issues. The specific challenge is how to plan for and organize the leadership and management in unexpected situations which can vary from ordinary disruptions to exceptional situations. The basic rule according to this study should be to follow the normal competences as long as possible. Separate structures and specific crisis organizations were seen to hinder effective response actions in real situations. The positive outcome of the security strategy work has been the commitment of organizations and their management to the strategy process. Yet, to ensure the effectiveness of strategy process calls for efforts on keeping the division of responsibilities and legislation clear and transparent and to take into account the different working cultures of different ministries.

The aspects of public value are reflected in results expressing the developments of cross-sectional approaches and defining values in connection to interfaces of different sectors. The focus is on the entity of the preparedness system and how the general principles of securing vital functions are taken into account. The important challenges remain on how the strategy process is implemented in everyday activities of government section and how to clarify the responsibilities of political leadership versus government officers in times of crises. Central stakeholders for strategy work are business community and NGOs. Both have their roles to play but at the same time the responsibility of the public actors remain to comprehensively manage the preparedness field. Outsourcing of public duties and growing interests of market forces in managing strategic activities in connection to emergency supply and critical infrastructures remain to be challenge for public preparedness work. From the civil society point of view the matters in connection to basic values of securing the vital functions are of great importance. The demand for cost-efficiency and flexible adjustment of preparedness can collide with the basic human rights.

Emergence and complexity are reflected in results tackling the available mechanisms for creating a common understanding of changes of threat landscape and taking into account these changes in strategy work and in decision making. In this connection reorganizations of the public administration and new forms of public-private-partnerships form a complex challenge in itself. The national situation awareness urges for information to be gathered and analyzed both horizontally across sectors and vertically between different levels of administration (local, regional, national). The mechanisms for collecting and analyzing information as well as for enhancing the organizational learning lessons from past events are of central importance in preparing for responding to emerging new threats.

This study will be continued in PhD thesis work at the University of Eastern Finland. In the further work the scope of the study will be widened to a comparative study between security strategy work in Finland and in Australia. The collaborative partner for studies in Australia will be Queensland University of Technology and its Center for Emergency and Disaster Management (CEDM).

**ACKNOWLEDGMENT:** This paper is based on my licentiate thesis accepted at the University of Vaasa in spring 2012. I kindly thank professor Ari Salminen and PhD Olli-Pekka Viinamäki for their supervision for my work. Professor Anssi Keinänen (UEF) and professor Paul Barnes (QUT) are to thank for encouragement to study my material from fresh angles and raising interest to further international co-operation in this field.

## REFERENCES

- 1) Sundelius, B.: *From National Total Defense to Embedded Societal Security*. In: Hamilton, D., Sundelius, B. and Grönvall, J. (Eds.): *Protecting the Homeland: European Approaches to Societal Security – Implications for United States*. Center for Transatlantic Relations. Washington DC, pp. 1-16, 2005.
- 2) OECD: *Emerging Risks in the 21st Century. An Agenda for Action*. OECD, Paris, 2003.
- 3) OECD: *Emerging Risks in the 21st Century. An Agenda for Action*. OECD, Paris, 2003. p.54
- 4) Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B. and Lampel, J.: *Strategy Safari*. Free Press, New York, 1998
- 5) Lindblom, C.E.: *Still Muddling not yet through*. Public Administration Review, nov/dec 1979. pp. 517-526, 1979
- 6) Bryson, J.M.: *Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations*. 3rd Edition. Jossey-Bass, 2004.
- 7) Boin, A. and 't Hart, P.: *Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?* Public Administration Review. Vol. 63, No 5. pp. 544-553, 2003.
- 8) Comfort, L.K.: *Rethinking Security: Organizational Fragility in Extreme Events*. Public Administration Review. Vol. 62, Special Issue. pp. 98-107, 2002.
- 9) Tiili, M.: *Ministers as strategic political leaders? Strategic political steering after NPM reforms in Finland*. Acta Politica 34, Department of Political Science, University of Helsinki. Helsinki University Print, 2008
- 10) Weber, M.: *From Max Weber: essays in sociology/* translated, edited and with an introduction by H.H.Gerth and C. Wright Mills with a new preface by Bryan S. Turner. Routledge, London, 1991.
- 11) Simon, H.A.: *Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organizations* (4th ed.). New York: Free Press, 1997.
- 12) Bartels, K.P.R.: *The Disregard for Weber's Herrschaft The Relevance of Weber's Ideal Type of Bureaucracy for the Modern Study of Public Administration*. Administrative Theory & Praxis. Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 447-478, 2009.
- 13) Thatcher, D. and Rein, M.: *Managing Value Conflict in Public Policy*. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions. Vol. 17, No. 4, pp 457-486, 2004.
- 14) Edwards, C.: *National Security for the Twenty-first Century*. Demos. ISBN 978 1 84180 190 2, 2007.
- 15) Alaa, G.: *Derivation of Factors Facilitating Organizational Emergence Based On Complex Adaptive Systems and Social Auto-poiesis Theories*. E:CO Issue Vol. 11 No. 1 2009 pp. 19-34, 2009.
- 16) Lichtenstein, Benyamin B.: *Self-organized transitions: A pattern amid the chaos of transformative change*. The Academy of Management Executive; Nov 2000; Vol. 14, No. 4. pp. 128-141, 2000.
- 17) Meek, J.W. and Newell, W.H.: *Complexity, Interdisciplinarity and Public Administration: Implications for Integrating Communities*. Public Administration Quarterly. Fall 2005, Vol. 29, No. 3. pp. 321-349, 2005.
- 10) Finnish Government Resolution 27.11.2003
- 11) Finnish Government Resolution 16.12.2010